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THE BATTLE OF 
SPRING HILL, TENNESSEE 

November 29, 1864 

A refutation of the erroneous statements made 

by Captain Scofield in his paper entitled 

"The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville" 



Captain John K. Shellenberger 



One hundred, twenty-five 

copies privately printed for the author by 

THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY 

Cleveland: 19 13 



THE BATTLE OF 
SPRING HILL, TENNESSEE 



THE BATTLE OF 
SPRING HILL, TENNESSEE 

November 29, 1864 

A refutation of the erroneous statements made 

by Captain Scolield in his paper entitled 

"The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville" 



Captain John K. Shellenberger 



One hundred, twenty-five 

copies privately printed for the author by 

THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY 

Cleveland: 19 13 



'055^ 



FOREWORD 

In the second volume Sketches of War History, 
issued by the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, 
there is a paper entitled "The Retreat from Pulaski 
to Nashville" prepared and read December i, 1886, 
by Captain Levi T. Scofield (spelled without an "h") 
although it would appear from their similar methods 
that he and General John M. Schofield (spelled with 
an "h") were scions from the same tree. 

This paper, while indulging in extravagant praise 
of the generalship of Schofield and Cox during that 
retreat, to which no one would raise any serious ob- 
jection, descended to the sneaking methods of an assas- 
sin in its desire to smirch the reputation of Wagner's 
Division - a division, which by its conduct in both the 
Battles of Spring Hill and Franklin, saved the army 
from an imminent danger of destruction to which it 
was subjected by grossly incompetent generalship. 
As an instance of the covert methods used by Captain 
Scofield in his efforts to dishonor Wagner's Division, 
in describing what occurred in the Battle of Franklin, 
he cunningly puts the ugly word, "cowards," which 
he was afraid to use himself, into the mouth of Gen- 
eral Wagner: "with terrible oaths he called them 
cowards," and he indorses the fitness of the epithet by 
his own statement: "but back they went to the town 
and nothing could stop them." 



8 Foreword 

At the close of that campaign I knew in a general 
way, as any subaltern participant would know, that 
gross blunders had been committed but was ignorant 
regarding on whom the responsibility for the blunders 
primarily rested. Some years before Captain Sco- 
field's paper appeared I had been in correspondence 
with General Opdycke and from him had learned 
much about the true inwardness of the Battle of 
Franklin. He was writing a history of that campaign 
and at his request I had furnished him a statement of 
what I knew about it. Unfortunately he died before 
his work was completed and with his death my interest 
in the matter lapsed until the appearance of Captain 
Scofield's paper. I then began a critical investigation 
to make a reply and soon struck the right trail regard- 
ing the responsibility for the blunders and followed 
it home. My paper was completed by the latter part 
of 1889 and was sent to the Ohio Commandery, 
where it was rejected for "harsh criticism of general 
officers." The influence of General Cox was then too 
strong in the Ohio Commandery for me to get a hear- 
ing. I next sent the paper to the National Tribune^ 
in which it appeared in the issues of January 30, Feb- 
ruary 6 and 13, 1890. Many letters were received 
about it- mostly complimentary but a few abusive. 
The most valued one came from General Stanley in 
which he stated that he was "surprised at the accuracy 
with which you state your points." He did not 
mention General Schofield's name in this letter and 
was always very guarded in subsequent letters of any 
mention of him, but in a later one, referring especially 



Foreword 9 

to the Battle of Spring Hill, he stated, "Schofield's 
claim [he has lectured on it], that it was all thought 
out and planned by him, is trash." In the same mail 
with the first letter came a much longer one from Mrs. 
Stanley, scoring General Schofield and praising me 
highly for the fearless manner in which I had told the 
truth about him. Thus came assurances from the 
most reliable source as to the truth of what I had told. 
Some of the letters received at that time contained 
valuable bits of criticism and additional bits of in- 
formation of which I took advantage in subsequent 
papers. In 1902, being then a resident of St. Paul, I 
prepared a monograph on the Battle of Franklin 
which was read before the Minnesota Commandery 
at the meeting of December 9, 1902. They seemed 
to enjoy "harsh criticism of general officers" in Min- 
nesota, for the recorder assured me no other paper had 
ever held more closely the undivided attention of its 
auditors. Many of my correspondents had expressed 
the wish that I would publish in pamphlet form the 
National Tribune article, but this was never done. 
Of the Franklin monograph a pamphlet edition was 
printed and copies were mailed to every Commandery 
of the Loyal Legion, to historical libraries, and to 
many individuals, including General Schofield and 
Captain Scofield. In my Franklin researches I had 
incidentally picked up much valuable information 
concerning the Battle of Spring Hill and after the 
issue of the Franklin pamphlet I carried the Spring 
Hill investigation to a finish, making a special trip to 
Spring Hill, in October, 1906, to verify some of my 



lO Foreword 

data. The result was a monograph on that battle 
which was read at a meeting of the Missouri Com- 
mandery of the Loyal Legion, February 2, 1907. A 
pamphlet edition was printed and distributed as be- 
fore. 

Since then Captain Scofield has issued his paper in 
a small bound volume profusely illustrated with por- 
traits and pictures, and with several maps. One of 
these maps professes to be of Spring Hill and vicinity, 
drawn to scale, but really a creation of his own imag- 
ination, a forgery made to back up the preposterous 
claims of the regiment to which he belonged. He put 
down roads and streams where none existed. He 
located Wagner's entire division in a double line of 
battle immediately south of Spring Hill and in front 
of the position occupied by his own regiment. Man- 
ifestly this was done to uphold the claim that his 
regiment had repulsed the rebel attack after Wagner's 
Division, in its front, had broken and run. As a mat- 
ter of fact not a single regiment of Wagner's Division 
was in the immediate vicinity where he located it. 
Bradley's Brigade was more than half a mile to the 
southeast. Lane's Brigade, the nearest flank, several 
hundred yards to the northeast, and Opdycke's Bri- 
gade about a half mile to the north. He had a copy 
of my pamphlet which told the truth about the loca- 
tion of Wagner's Division, as any one can verify who 
will consult the official reports. I, therefore, charge 
that in the preparation of his map he showed shame- 
less dishonesty. The map accompanying this pam- 
phlet is practically correct as I verified in my visit to 
Spring Hill in 1906. 



Foreword 1 1 

The text following, except for a few slight verbal 
corrections, is the same as the paper read at the meet- 
ing of the Missouri Commandery of the Loyal Le- 
gion, February 2, 1907. 

John K. Shellenberger. 
Hampton, Virginia, March, 1913. 







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PREFACE 

More than twenty-five years have passed since I 
began to collect the materials from which this pam- 
phlet has been evolved. As a substantial basis to 
begin with, I was an eye-witness of all the fighting in 
the vicinity of Spring Hill, that amounted to anything, 
from the time Forrest attacked the 64th Ohio on the 
skirmish line until Cleburne's Division recoiled from 
the fire of the battery posted at the village. 

Since I began collecting I have neglected no oppor- 
tunity to increase my stock of information by conver- 
sation, reading, or correspondence. I have twice re- 
visited the battlefield. I have the government vol- 
ume containing the official reports, all of which I have 
carefully studied. Among my correspondents on the 
Union side have been Generals Stanley, Wilson, Op- 
dycke. Lane, and Bradley, besides many others of 
lesser rank. I am as confident, from their letters, that 
my paper would have the approval of those named, 
who are now dead, as I am sure it has the approval of 
General Wilson, to whom a manuscript copy was sub- 
mitted for criticism. 

Among other Confederates, I wrote to General S. 
D. Lee, who referred me to Judge J. P. Young of 
Memphis, Tennessee, with the statement that he had 
exhausted the subject on the Confederate side. He 
was present at Spring Hill as a boy soldier in Forrest's 



14 Preface 

cavalry, and for years has been engaged in writing a 
history of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, to 
which he has given an enormous amount of careful 
research. To him I am indebted for much of the 
most valuable part of my information concerning the 
Confederate troops. From the materials thus gath- 
ered I have tried to give, within the compass of a Loyal 
Legion paper, a clear and truthful account of the 
affair just as it happened. That opinions will differ, 
is shown by the fact that Judge Young holds General 
Brown responsible for the Confederate failure, while 
I believe that Cheatham, Stewart, and Bate were all 
greater sinners than Brown. He was acting under 
the eye of Cheatham, who could easily have forced 
an attack by Brown's Division if he had been equal to 
the occasion. 

By a curious coincidence General Lee was present 
as the guest of the Missouri Commandery at the meet- 
ing when the paper was read, and, in commenting on 
it. General Lee stated that I had told the truth about 
as it had occurred. The deductions made from the 
facts stated are my own. 



THE BATTLE OF SPRING HILL 

It may be fairly claimed that the success of General 
Sherman's famous march to the sea hung on the issue 
of a minor battle fought at Spring Hill, in middle 
Tennessee, the evening of November 29, 1864, when 
Sherman and his army were hundreds of miles away 
in the heart of Georgia. It will be remembered 
that when Sherman started from Atlanta for Savannah 
his old antagonist, General Hood, was at Florence, 
Alabama, refitting his army to the limit of the waning 
resources of the Confederacy for an aggressive cam- 
paign into Tennessee. If Hood's campaign had 
proved successful, Sherman's unopposed march 
through Georgia would have been derided as a crazy 
freak, and, no doubt, the old charge of insanity would 
have been revived against him. By how narrow a 
margin Hood missed a brilliant success, a truthful 
account of the Spring Hill afifair will disclose. Much 
has been written by interested generals of both sides 
and by their partisan friends to mislead as to 
the real situation. With no personal friendships or 
enmities to subserve, it is the intention of this paper 
to tell the truth without any regard to its efifect on the 
reputation of any general. Federal or Confederate. 

The Administration gave a reluctant consent to 
Sherman's plan on the condition that he would leave 
with General Thomas, commanding in Tennessee, a 



i6 John K. Shellenberger 



force strong enough to defeat Hood. On paper 
Thomas had plenty of men; but Sherman had taken 
his pick of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and transporta- 
tion, leaving the odds and ends with Thomas, consist- 
ing largely of post troops garrisoning towns, bridge 
guards in block-houses along the railroads, new regi- 
ments recruited by the payment of the big bounties that 
produced the infamous tribe of bounty jumpers, negro 
regiments never yet tested in battle, green drafted men 
assigned to some of the old depleted regiments in such 
large numbers as to change their veteran character, 
dismounted cavalrymen sent back to get horses, and 
convalescents and furloughed men belonging to the 
army with Sherman who had come up too late to join 
their commands, organized into temporary compan- 
ies and regiments. 

Moreover, Thomas's forces were scattered from east 
Tennessee to central Missouri, where General A. J. 
Smith, with two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, was 
marching for St. Louis to take steamboats to join 
Thomas at Nashville. The only force available for 
immediate field service consisted of the Fourth and 
the Twenty-third Corps, the two weakest corps of 
Sherman's army, which he had sent back to Thomas. 
These two corps, temporarily commanded by General 
Schofield, were thrown well forward towards Flor- 
ence to delay Hood long enough for Thomas to con- 
centrate and organize from his widely scattered re- 
sources a force strong enough to give battle to Hood. 

Passing over all prior operations, we will take up 
the situation as it was the morning of November 29. 
General Schofield had then well in hand on the north 



The Battle of Spring Hill ij 

bank of Duck River, opposite Columbia, Tennessee, 
the divisions of Kimball, Wagner, and Wood, com- 
posing the Fourth Corps, and of Cox and Ruger, of 
the Twenty-third Corps, Ruger's lacking one brigade 
on detached service. Across the river were two divi- 
sions of General S. D. Lee's corps of Hood's Army. 
The preceding evening Hood, himself, with the corps 
of Cheatham and Stewart, and Johnson's division of 
Lee's corps, had moved up the river five and one-half 
miles to Davis's Ford, where he was laying his pon- 
toons preparatory to crossing. His plan was to detain 
Schofield at the river by feinting with two divisions 
while he would lead seven divisions past the left flank 
and plant them across Schofield's line of retreat at 
Spring Hill, twelve miles north of Duck River. As 
Hood greatly outnumbered Schofield, his plan con- 
templated the destruction of Schofield's army. 

During the evening of the twenty-eighth, General 
Wilson, commanding our cavalry, had learned enough 
of Hood's movement to divine its purpose. In view 
of its vital importance and to insure a delivery, he sent 
a message in triplicate, each courier riding by a sepa- 
rate road, informing Schofield of what Hood was 
doing, and advising and urging him to get back to 
Spring Hill with all his army by ten o'clock, the 
twenty-ninth. General Wilson has stated that his 
couriers all got through, the one riding by the shortest 
road reaching Schofield's headquarters at three 
o'clock in the morning of the twenty-ninth. 

From the reports sent him by Wilson, General 
Thomas at Nashville had also correctly divined 
Hood's intention, and in a dispatch dated at three- 



1 8 John K. Shellenberger 



thirty o'clock in the morning of the twenty-ninth - but 
by the neglect of the night operator not transmitted 
until six o'clock, when the day operator came on duty - 
he ordered Schofield to fall back to Franklin, leaving 
a sufficient force at Spring Hill to delay Hood until he 
was securely posted at Franklin. 

I was commanding Company B, 64th Ohio Regi- 
ment, Bradley's Brigade, Wagner's division. The 
brigade was under arms that morning by four o'clock, 
and had orders to be ready to march on a moment's 
notice. It is assumed that all the rest of the army 
received the same orders, and that this action was taken 
on account of the information brought by Wilson's 
courier at three o'clock. But nothing was done until 
eight o'clock, when the movements began which dis- 
posed of our army as follows : 

Wagner's division was sent to Spring Hill to guard 
the reserve artillery and the wagon trains, which had 
all been ordered there, from any raid by Hood's caval- 
ry. General Stanley, the corps commander, went 
with Wagner. Cox's division was posted along the 
river, and was engaged all day in skirmishing with the 
two divisions under Lee, which kept up a noisy dem- 
onstration of forcing a crossing. Ruger's two bri- 
gades were posted four miles north of Duck River, 
where the pike to Spring Hill crosses Rutherford's 
Creek, to hold that crossing. The divisions of Kim- 
ball and Wood were aligned between Cox and Ruger, 
facing up the river towards Hood's crossing. At nine 
o'clock Post's brigade, of Wood's division, was sent up 
the river to reconnoiter, and before eleven o'clock 
Post had reached a position where he could see Hood's 



The Battle of Spring Hill 19 

column marching towards Spring Hill, and repeated- 
ly reported that fact. 

Nevertheless none of the four divisions near Duck 
River were started for Spring Hill until after four 
o'clock, when Schofield had heard from Stanley that 
Hood was attacking at Spring Hill. 

After the campaign Schofield claimed that its suc- 
cess was due to his intimate knowledge of Hood's 
character, gained while they were classmates at West 
Point, which enabled him to foresee what Hood 
would do under any given conditions, and then make 
the best dispositions for defeating him. When, two 
months later, Schofield was in Washington, where 
they knew nothing about the details of the campaign, 
he so successfully impressed his claim on the Admin- 
istration that he was given the same promotion with 
which General Sheridan had been rewarded for the 
victory at Winchester, jumping at one bound from 
the rank of captain to that of brigadier-general in the 
regular army. But it is plain that after five hours of 
deliberation that morning Schofield had reached a 
wrong conclusion as to Hood's intention, for if "Ac- 
tions speak louder than words," there can be no ques- 
tion that Schofield's dispositions were made under 
the conviction that Hood would march down the 
river, after crossing, to clear the way for Lee to cross. 
And so deeply infatuated was he with this self-im- 
posed delusion that, disregarding the order of Thomas 
and the advice of Wilson, he cherished it for about 
five hours after Post had reported that Hood was 
marching towards Spring Hill. 

Wagner's advance, double-quicking through Spring 



20 John K. Shellenberger 

Hill at noon, and deploying just beyond on a run, in- 
terposed barely in time to head ofif the advance of 
Hood's cavalry, Wagner arriving by the Columbia 
Pike from the southwest and the cavalry by the Mount 
Carmel Road from the east. General Forrest, com- 
manding Hood's cavalry, had used his superior num- 
bers so skillfully as to push back Wilson with our 
cavalry just north of Mount Carmel, which is five 
miles east of Spring Hill, before noon. Leaving one 
brigade to watch Wilson, Forrest then crossed over 
to Spring Hill with all the rest of his three divisions 
of cavalry. If Wagner had arrived a few minutes 
later he would have found Forrest in possession at 
Spring Hill. 

General Cox, in his book on this campaign, claims 
that General Wilson committed a grave error in not 
crossing over to Spring Hill, in advance of Forrest, 
with all our cavalry. But in justice to Wilson it must 
be remembered that at Mount Carmel he acted under 
the belief that Schofield was following the advice he 
had given early that morning. If Schofield had been 
at Spring Hill at ten o'clock, as Wilson had advised, 
with all his infantry, what reason could there have 
been for the cavalry joining him there? 

When Bradley's brigade, the rear of Wagner's col- 
umn, was nearing Spring Hill, some of the cavalry 
approached the pike through the fields to reconnoiter, 
and the 64th Ohio was sent to drive them away. With 
the right wing deployed as skirmishers and the left 
wing in reserve, the regiment advanced steadily, driv- 
ing before it the cavalry, without replying to the 
harmless long-range fire they kept up with their car- 



The Battle of Spring Hill 21 

bines, but always galloping away before we could get 
within effective range. About a mile east of the pike 
we crossed the Rally Hill Road. This was the road 
by which Hood's infantry column approached. There 
it runs north nearly parallel with the pike to a point 
five hundred yards east of Spring Hill, where it 
turns west to enter the village. Leaving one of the 
reserve companies to watch the road, the rest of the 
regiment kept on in pursuit of the cavalry until our 
skirmishers were abreast of the Caldwell house, about 
eight hundred yards east of the road, when a halt was 
called. A few minutes later, at two-thirty o'clock, 
the left of our skirmish line, north of the Caldwell 
house, was attacked by a line of battle in front while 
the cavalry worked around our left flank. At the 
time we believed the battle line to be a part of Hood's 
infantry, and in a letter from General Bradley he 
states that it caused great consternation at headquar- 
ters in Spring Hill when Major Coulter of the 64th 
came galloping back with the information that the 
regiment was fighting with infantry. But investiga- 
tion has disclosed that the battle line was composed of 
rnounted infantry belonging to Forrest's command. 
They were armed with Enfield rifles and always 
fought on foot like ordinary infantry, using their 
horses for traveling rapidly from place to place. 

The four reserve companies were thrown in on a 
run at the point of contact; but our line was soon 
forced to fall back by the cavalry turning our left 
flank, where they cut off and captured three of our 
skirmishers. One of the three was badly wounded 
that evening in trying to escape, a bullet entering from 



22 John K. Shellenberger 



behind and passing through his mouth in a way to 
knock out nearly one-half of all his teeth. We found 
him in a hospital at Spring Hill when passing through 
in pursuit of Hood's army after the victory at Nash- 
ville. In relating his experience he stated that when 
they were captured they were taken before some gen- 
eral, name unknown to him, who questioned them 
closely as to what force was holding Spring Hill. 
The general was probably Forrest, for he was per- 
sonally directing the attack on the 64th, but may have 
been Hood himself, for he was on the Rally Hill 
Road, less than a mile away, soon after the men were 
captured. They all declared that they knew the 
Fourth Corps was at Spring Hill, and they believed 
all the rest of the army. Their declaration must have 
carried greater weight on account of their own faith 
in what they were telling, for at that time the whole 
regiment believed that all the rest of the army had 
followed to Spring Hill close on the heels of Wag- 
ner's division. 

Eventually the 64th was driven back across the 
Rally Hill Road, where a last stand was made in a 
large woods covering a broad ridge abutting on the 
road about three-fourths of a mile southeast of Spring 
Hill. While in these woods, occurred a bit of excit- 
ing personal experience. A bullet, coming from the 
right, passed through my overcoat, buttoned up to my 
chin, in a way to take along the top button of my 
blouse underneath the coat. That big brass button 
struck me a stinging blow on the point of the left col- 
lar-bone, and, clasping both hands to the spot, I com- 
menced feeling for the hole with my finger tips, fully 



The Battle of Spring Hill 23 

convinced that a bullet coming from the front had 
gone through me there and had inflicted a serious and 
possibly a mortal wound. It was not until I had 
opened the coat for a closer investigation that I found 
I was worse scared than hurt. Some of the enemy 
had secured a position on our right flank, where they 
opened an enfilading fire, and it was one of their bul- 
lets that had hit me. To get out of that fire the regi- 
ment fell back towards the interior of the woods, 
where it was so close to our main line that it was called 
in. 

It was then about three-thirty o'clock, and by that 
time the situation of our army had become so critical 
that nothing short of the grossest blundering on the 
part of the enemy could save it from a great disaster, 
and there was a fine possibility for destroying it. 

Wagner's division had so much property to protect 
that it was stretched out on a line extending from the 
railway station, nearly a mile northwest of Spring 
Hill, where two trains of cars were standing on the 
track, around by the north, east, and south, to the 
Columbia Pike on the southwest. Behind this long 
line the village streets and the adjacent fields were 
crammed with nearly everything on wheels belonging 
to our army- ambulances, artillery carriages, and 
army wagons to the number of about eight hundred 
vehicles. The nearest support was Ruger's two bri- 
gades, eight miles away, and it was about an hour later 
before Ruger had started for Spring Hill. Opdycke's 
brigade was covering the railway station and the 
Franklin Pike on the north, and Lane's brigade the 
Mount Carmel Road on the east. They had a con- 



24 John K. Shellenberger 

nected line; but it was so long that much of it con- 
sisted of skirmishers only. They had in their front 
detachments of Forrest's cavalry feeling along their 
line for an opening to get at the trains. Bradley's 
brigade occupied an advanced, detached position on 
the ridge to the southeast, that has been mentioned, to 
cover the approach by the Rally Hill Road. There 
v^as a gap of half a mile between Lane's right in front 
of Spring Hill and Bradley's left out on the ridge. 
Bradley had in his immediate front the main body of 
Forrest's three divisions of cavalry and the three divi- 
sions of infantry composing Cheatham's corps, while 
four more divisions of infantry were within easy sup- 
porting distance. In brief, ten of the twelve divisions, 
cavalry included, composing Hood's army, were in 
front of Spring Hill; and at four o'clock Hood was 
attacking with his infantry Wagner's lone division, 
guarding all our trains, while Schofield was still wait- 
ing for Hood at Duck River with four divisions from 
eight to twelve miles away. If Wagner's division 
had been wiped out -a very easy possibility for the 
overwhelming numbers confronting it while stretched 
out on a line about three miles long, without any 
breastworks - the rich prize of our ambulance train, 
six batteries of artillery, and all our wagons with 
their loads of supplies would have fallen into Hood's 
hands, and the retreat of the four divisions would 
have been squarely cut ofif, while having a short sup- 
ply of artillery and no food or ammunition except 
what the men were carrying in their haversacks and 
cartridge boxes. The escape of our army from this 
deadly peril was largely due to the great skill with 



The Battle of Spring Hill 25 

which General Stanley handled the situation at Spring 
Hill, but manifestly no amount of skill on the part of 
Stanley could have saved us, where the disadvantages 
were so great, if the enemy had improved with a very 
ordinary degree of vigor and intelligence the oppor- 
tunity opened to them by Schofield's delusion as to 
Hood's intention. General Hood rode with the ad- 
vance of his column until after it had crossed Ruther- 
ford's Creek, two and one-half miles south of Spring 
Hill. It was then about three o'clock. There was 
no bridge, and his men had to wade the creek, which 
caused some delay. A short distance north of the 
crossing Hood met Forrest and received his report of 
the situation at Spring Hill as he had developed it 
during the three hours preceding. He had met with 
resistance on so long a line that no doubt he greatly 
overestimated the force holding Spring Hill, and such 
an estimate would agree with the story told by the 
captured 64th men. 

On the other hand, a courier had arrived with a 
report from Lee that Schofield's main body was still 
in his front at Duck River, and Lee's report was con- 
firmed by the sounds of the heavy cannonading that 
had been coming from his direction. These reports 
disclosed that a part of Schofield's army was at Spring 
Hill and a part at Duck River, but they conflicted as 
to which position was held by his main body. In the 
uncertainty thus arising. Hood decided, as his dispos- 
itions clearly show, that his first move must be to plant 
Cheatham's corps on the pike between those two parts. 
Developments would then determine his next move. 
Cleburne's division was the first to cross the creek, and 



26 John K. Shellenberger 



marching up the road until his advance was close to 
the woods where Forrest's men were fighting with the 
64th Ohio, Cleburne halted and formed his battle line 
along the road facing west towards the Columbia 
Pike. If the intention had been to make a direct 
attack, his line would have formed facing north to- 
wards our line in the woods, where its position had 
been developed by Forrest. The intention unques- 
tionably was for Cleburne, avoiding any encounter 
with our line in the woods, first to cross over to the 
pike and then change direction and advance on Spring 
Hill astride the pike, while Bate's division, following 
Cleburne's, received orders as reported by Bate, to 
cross to the pike and then sweep down the pike to- 
wards Columbia. Hood himself gave the orders to 
Cleburne and Bate and then established his headquar- 
ters at the Thompson farm house near-by, about five 
hundred yards west of the Rally Hill Road, and near- 
ly two miles south of Spring Hill, where he remained 
till next morning. To save time Cleburne started for 
the pike as soon as he was ready, and Bate, then form- 
ing on Cleburne's left, followed as soon as his forma- 
tion was completed. 

While Cleburne and Bate were moving out. Gen- 
eral Cheatham was at the crossing hurrying over 
Brown's division. Thus Brown could support either 
Cleburne or Bate, as developments might dictate. 
Uncandid statements have been made that Cheatham's 
divisions were moved around in a disjointed manner 
and without any plan. There was not only a logical 
plan but a successful plan, if it had been carried out, 
in the orders given to Cheatham's divisions. The 



The Battle of Spring Hill 27 

other four divisions were halted south of Rutherford's 
Creek, and fronted into line facing west towards the 
Columbia Pike. This proves that it was then Hood's 
belief that Schofield's main body was still at Duck 
River. If it should march up the pike and attack 
Bate, the four divisions would be on its flank. If it 
should attempt to reach the fortifications at Murf rees- 
boro by cutting across the country south of Spring 
Hill, the four divisions would be in a position to in- 
tercept it. 

General Bradley had four regiments in line in the 
woods on the ridge, with the left towards the Rally 
Hill Road and the right trending away towards the 
pike. They faced in a southeasterly direction. To 
cover more ground there were short gaps between the 
regiments. The 65th Ohio was the right regiment of 
the four, and to the right rear of the 65th was a gap of 
a couple hundred yards extending out into cleared 
land, where the /\.2& Illinois was posted, refused as to 
the 65th and facing south to cover that flank. To the 
front, right, and rear of the 42d was a broad expanse 
of rolling fields extending on the right to the pike, 
about one thousand yards away, where two guns were 
posted to sweep the fields in front of the 42d with their 
fire. To the left of the 42d an extension of the woods 
ran out into the fields and concealed the 42d from 
Cleburne until he had advanced almost abreast of its 
position. When the 64th came oH the skirmish line 
it was sent to the support of the 42d. The 36th Illi- 
nois, Opdycke's only reserve, was hurried across on 
double-quick from the other side of Spring Hill to 
support the two guns at the pike. As many guns of 



28 John K. Shellenberger 



the reserve artillery as could be utilized were placed 
in battery around the southeasterly skirt of the village, 
looking towards Bradley's position. Bradley's men 
very hastily had constructed weak barricades of rails 
or anything else they could lay their hands on. The 
42d had such protection as was afforded by a rail 
fence. 

Shortly before four o'clock, having completed his 
formation, Cleburne started to march across to the 
pike. His division consisted of four brigades, but 
one was on detached duty, and he had three in line- 
Lowrey's on his right, then Govan's, then Granbury's. 
First crossing a field in his front, Lowrey entered the 
extension of the woods that has been mentioned, and 
on emerging on the other side his right came in view 
within easy range of the 42d, and that regiment opened 
an enfilading fire, Lowrey's line being then almost per- 
pendicular to the line of the 42d. It was this accident 
of Lowrey's right passing within range of the 42d that 
led to the failure of Hood's plan, which, up to that 
minute, had been a great success. When the 42d 
opened fire the two guns at the pike also opened, their 
fire crossing that of the 42d, and the 64th, running 
forward and intermingling ranks with the 42d, poured 
in their fire. When our fire had thus developed our 
position, out in those wide fields they could see just 
what we had. They pulled down the rims of their 
old hats over their eyes, bent their heads to the storm 
of missiles pouring upon them, changed direction to 
their right on double-quick in a manner that excited 
our admiration, and a little later a long line came 
sweeping through the wide gap between the right of 



The Battle of Spring Hill 29 

the 42d and the pike, and swinging in towards our 
rear. Our line stood firm, holding back the enemy 
in front until the flank movement had progressed so 
far as to make it a question of legs to escape capture 
when the regimental commanders gave the reluctant 
order to fall back. The contact was then so close that 
as the men on our right were running past the line 
closing in on them they were called on with loud oaths, 
charging them with a Yankee canine descent, to halt 
and surrender; and, not heeding the call, some of 
them were shot down with the muzzles of the muskets 
almost touching their bodies. By the recession of the 
two regiments on the flank the rear of the four regi- 
ments in the woods became exposed. They were at- 
tacked at the same time by Forrest in front and by 
Cleburne on their right and rear and were speedily 
dislodged. The attack was pressed with so much 
vigor that, in a few minutes after the 42d had opened 
fire, Bradley's entire brigade was in rapid retreat to- 
wards Spring Hill, with Cleburne in close pursuit 
and pouring in a hot fire. In falling back we had to 
cross the valley of a small stream; and I never think 
of our strenuous exertions to get out of a destructive 
cross-fire, while running down the easy slope leading 
to the stream, without recalling the story of the officer 
who called to a soldier making the best time he could 
to get out of a hot fire : "Stop, my man! What are 
you running for?" 

"Because I have no wings to fly with," called back 
the soldier over his shoulder while increasing his 
efforts to make better time. 

As we descended into the valley, we uncovered our 



30 John K. Shellenberger 

pursuers to the fire of the battery at the village, which 
opened with shrapnel shells firing over our heads. 
General Stanley, who was in the battery, reported that 
not less than eight guns opened fire. As soon as Cle- 
burne encountered that fire, he hastily drew back over 
the ridge out of sight. All pursuit with its accom- 
panying direct and cross-fire having thus ceased, 
Bradley's men stopped running and walked back to 
the vicinity of the battery, where a new line was 
formed without trouble or confusion. When coming 
down the slope towards the stream, Major Coulter, 
whose horse had been killed, was running a few feet 
in front of me, and I was just speculating whether my 
short legs could keep up with his long ones, when he 
called back over his shoulder: "Rally at this fence," 
meaning a rail fence we were approaching. I had 
a poor opinion of the fence as a place to attempt a 
rally, for we would still be exposed to a cross-fire, but 
wishing to obey orders I made for the strongest look- 
ing fence corner in my front, and, jumping over and 
stopping behind it, looked around to see if any con- 
certed effort would be made to reform behind the 
fence. In my brief halt there I had some opportunity 
to observe the effect of our artillery fire on the enemy. 
I saw by the smoke where a number of our shells ex- 
ploded, and they all seemed too high in the air and 
too far to the rear, for I could not see any men knocked 
down by them. No doubt the fear of killing some of 
our own men caused our gunners to aim high; and it 
is probable that the noise made by so many guns and 
exploding shells had more to do with stopping the 
enemy than the execution that was done. Their after- 



The Battle of Spring Hill 31 

actions showed that they believed Bradley's brigade 
to have been an outpost, that our main line was where 
the battery was posted, and that so much artillery 
must have a correspondingly strong infantry support. 

General Bradley reported a loss of one hundred, 
ninety-eight men in his brigade, nearly all of it falling 
on the three regiments on the exposed flank, the other 
three regiments falling back with light loss, because 
their position had become untenable. He was dis- 
abled with a wound, and Colonel Conrad, of the 15th 
Missouri, then assumed command of the brigade. By 
the casualties in the 65th Ohio, the command of that 
regiment devolved upon the adjutant. Brewer Smith, 
a boy only nineteen years old, and possibly the young- 
est officer to succeed to the command of a regiment 
throughout the war. 

A regiment of the 23d corps, the provost guard at 
Schofield's headquarters, which had come to Spring 
Hill as a train guard, and was placed in support of the 
battery at the village, has persistently claimed that 
the salvation of our army was due to the heroic stand 
it made after all of Wagner's division had run away. 
In a historical sketch of the regiment in Ohio in the 
War by Whitelaw Reid, occurs this statement: 

At Spring Hill the regiment had another opportunity to 
show its pluck. A division that had been sent forward in 
charge of the trains was drawn up to resist any attack the rebels 
might make while the regiment, being with the headquarters 
train, was ordered to support a battery so placed as to sweep 
an open field in front of the troops. The enemy, emerging 
from the woods, marched steadily up to the National lines, 
when the entire division broke and ran. 

That is pretty strong language in view of the battle 



32 John K. Shellenberger 

record of Wagner's division, for of the four brigades 
out of all the brigades serving in all the western armies 
given prominent mention by Colonel Fox in his book 
on regimental losses as famous fighting brigades, two, 
Opdycke's and Bradley's, belonged to Wagner's divi- 
sion, to say nothing of the very awkward fact that the 
brigades of Opdycke and Lane were on the other side 
of Spring Hill, out of sight of Cleburne's attack, but 
it is seriously so stated - 

The entire division broke and ran, leaving the regiment 
and the battery to resist the attack. Fixing bayonets the 
men aw^aited the onset. As soon as the enemy came within 
range they poured a well-directed fire into their ranks which, 
being seconded by the battery, caused them to waver. Por- 
tions of the retreating division having rallied, the rebels were 
compelled to betake themselves to the woods. 

In a paper on this campaign, Captain Levi T. Scho- 
field relates how the officers of the regiment tried to 
stop the flying troops and taunted their officers with 
the bad example they were setting their men ; how the 
regiment opened a rapid, withering fire from a little 
parapet of cartridges which the officers, breaking open 
boxes of ammunition, had built in front of the men; 
and how their fire proved so destructive at that close 
range that it stopped Cheatham's men who then fell 
back and commenced building breastworks. In call- 
ing them Cheatham's men, did the captain wish to 
insinuate that Cheatham's whole corps was charging 
on the regiment? He uses the words withering, de- 
structive and that close range, in a way to raise the 
inference that the contact was very close. The actual 
distance was shrapnel-shell range, for the battery 
stopped Cleburne with those missiles before he had 



The Battle of Spring Hill 33 

crossed the little stream more than one thousand yards 
away, so that instead of a cool regiment of exceptional 
staying qualities, delivering a destructive fire at very 
close range, as pictured by the captain, the truth dis- 
closes a highly excited, not to say a badly scared regi- 
ment, wasting ammunition at too long range to do any 
damage. That this was the truth is proved by the 
very significant fact, not deemed worthy of mention 
in either of the accounts quoted, that the regiment did 
not lose a single man killed or wounded ; not one, and 
it was not protected by breastworks. With impres- 
sive mystery the captain describes the regiment as 
what was left of it after the way it had been cut up in 
the Atlanta campaign, with the same artful vagueness 
used in the matter of the range, seeking to create the 
inference that the battle losses of the regiment had 
been very extraordinary. Again, to be specific, the 
regiment lost in its three years' term of service two 
officers and thirty-seven men killed or died of wounds, 
less than one-third the average loss of the six regiments 
composing Bradley's brigade, and it stands one hun- 
dred, ninth among the infantry regiments of its state 
in the number of its battle losses, or, excepting six 
regiments that spent most of their time in garrison 
duty, at the bottom of the list of all three years' regi- 
ments sent from the state. It would appear that the 
103d Ohio had become pretty well imbued with the 
spirit characteristic of the headquarters with which 
it was associated- to claim credit in an inverse ratio 
to services rendered. 

When Cleburne changed direction his left swung 
in so close to the pike that the two guns and the 36th 



34 John K. Shellenberger 



Illinois were driven away and Cleburne could then 
have extended his left across the pike without meet- 
ing with any further opposition. 

Lowrey and Govan made the change in line of bat- 
tle while Granbury faced to the right and followed 
their movement in column of fours. Afterwards 
Granbury about-faced, and moving back some dis- 
tance in column, then fronted into line and advanced 
to a farm fence paralleling the pike at a distance vari- 
ously stated at from eighty to one hundred yards. His 
line there halted and laid down behind the fence. 
Cleburne and Granbury were both killed next day 
and it is not known why Granbury did not go on and 
take possession of the pike. The brigades of Lowrey 
and Govan had become so badly mixed up in the pur- 
suit of Bradley and in the recoil from the fire of the 
battery, that their line had to be reformed. When 
this was accomplished the intrepid Cleburne was 
about to resume his attack towards Spring Hill when 
he was stopped by an order from Cheatham, who had 
brought up Brown's division on Cleburne's right, and 
had also sent a staff officer to recall Bate with an order 
for him to close up and connect with Cleburne's left. 
This proves that developments, probably the fire of so 
many guns opening on Cleburne, had convinced 
Cheatham that the force holding Spring Hill was 
strong enough to demand the attention of his entire 
corps. His intention was for Brown to lead in an 
attack, Cleburne to follow Brown, and Bate, when he 
got up, to follow Cleburne. But on getting into posi- 
tion Brown reported to Cheatham that he was out- 
flanked several hundred yards on his right, and that 



The Battle of Spring Hill 35 

it would lead to inevitable disaster for him to attack. 
The 97th Ohio of Lane's brigade was to the left of the 
battery in front of Spring Hill, with the left of the 
97th extending towards Mount Carmel Road. The 
looth Illinois was on the other side of the road, sev- 
eral hundred yards in advance of the 97th Ohio, and 
the two regiments were connected by a part of the 40th 
Indiana deployed as skirmishers. That was the force 
that paralyzed the action of Brown's veteran division. 
Cheatham then directed Brown to refuse his right 
brigade to protect his flank and to attack with the rest 
of his division; but Brown, still hesitating, Cheatham 
then concluded that the force holding Spring Hill 
was too strong for his corps alone to attack, for he 
reported to Hood that the line in his front was too 
long for him, and that Stewart's corps must first come 
up and form on his right. But before Stewart could 
get up, night had come. 

It is notable that Brown's only excuse for not at- 
tacking was that he was out-flanked on his right, for 
the claim has been made that Hood arrived in front of 
Spring Hill too late in the day to accomplish anything, 
and Schofield himself has stated that his action was 
based on a cool calculation, made from his intimate 
knowledge of Hood's character, who had been defi- 
cient in mathematics as a cadet, and could make no ac- 
curate computation of the time required to overcome 
difficulties: that Hood, marching by a muddy coun- 
try road, would arrive in front of Spring Hill tired, 
sleepy, and so much later than he had calculated, that 
he would defer all action until next morning. Be- 
tween '^shortly after daylight," when he started from 



36 John K. Shellenberger 

Duck River, and three o'clock, when he had crossed 
Rutherford's Creek, Hood had ridden about ten 
miles - too short a distance to tire him out, and too 
early in the day to become sleepy. He then sent for- 
ward Cheatham's corps with plenty of time, before 
night came, for Cheatham to have made a secure 
lodgement on the pike, or to have run over Wagner's 
division, the way it was strung out, if Cleburne's at- 
tack had been promptly followed up with anything 
like the vigor with which he had jumped on Bradley's 
brigade. Hood's arrival in front of Spring Hill that 
afternoon was clearly a contingency unlooked for by 
Schofield, for it caught our army in a situation to 
leave no reasonable hope of escape without dire dis- 
aster, and Schofield himself, as will appear, was thor- 
oughly frightened by the situation. That his after- 
version of the saving merit of his cool calculation was 
fully accepted by the Administration is proved by the 
promotion he was given, when, in fact, his bad mis- 
calculation was responsible for getting the army into 
a trap from which it escaped through the failure of 
the enemy to shut the door. Of the miracle of that 
escape much remains to be told. When Wagner was 
coming to Spring Hill, the 26th Ohio was detached 
from the column to guard a country road entering the 
pike more than a mile southwest of Spring Hill. Cap- 
tain Kelly, of the 26th, informed me that the regiment 
was driven of¥ that evening by a line of battle so long 
as to extend far beyond either flank of the 26th. That 
was Bate's division, and after driving ofif the 26th 
there was nothing whatever to prevent Bate from 
sweeping down the pike towards Columbia. If he 



The Battle of Spring Hill 37 

had diligently obeyed that order he would have pro- 
gressed so far before Cheatham's recall order reached 
him that he would have met Ruger coming to Spring 
Hill, and then the cat would have been out of the bag. 
Bate declined to obey Cheatham's first order because 
it conflicted with the order direct from Hood, under 
which he was acting, and Cheatham's order had to be 
repeated. When the second order reached Bate he 
was still loitering where he had encountered the 26th 
Ohio. He had wasted about two hours of precious 
time in doing nothing, for he had not only disobeyed 
Hood's order to sweep down the pike, but he had not 
even made a lodgement on the pike. It was then 
about six-thirty o'clock, after dark, and Ruger's ad- 
vance was just coming along. First leaving orders 
for the other divisions to follow after dark, about 
four-thirty o'clock Schofield had started with Ruger 
to reinforce Stanley. Ruger skirmished with Bate 
at the place and time indicated; but as Bate was off 
to the east side, instead of astride the pike, where by 
Hood's order he should have been, Ruger had no 
difficulty in pushing past Bate. Granbury's brigade 
was still lying behind the fence, close to the pike, and 
after passing Bate, Ruger had to run the gantlet of 
Granbury's line. Granbury had been notified that 
Bate was coming from the left, and hearing Ruger 
marching along the pike in the darkness, he mistook 
him for Bate, so that Schofield himself, with Ruger, 
rode along right under the muzzles of the muskets of 
Granbury's line, in blissful ignorance of the danger 
they were passing. Captain English, Granbury's as- 
sistant adjutant-general, advanced towards the pike 



38 John K. Shellenberger 

to investigate, but was captured by the flankers cover- 
ing the march of Ruger's column, belonging to the 
23d Michigan. Elias Bartlett of the 36th Illinois, 
was on picket on the pike at the bridge across the creek 
a half mile south of Spring Hill, and he informed me 
that when Schofield came to his post he began eagerly 
to inquire what had happened, saying that he had 
feared everything at Spring Hill had been captured; 
also that while they were talking, a Confederate 
picket, near enough to hear the sound of their voices, 
fired on them, and Schofield then rode on. A little 
later Bate came up through the fields, Granbury fell 
back from the fence and Cleburne and Bate then con- 
nected and adjusted a new line with Bate's left brigade 
refused so as to face the pike and all the rest of their 
line running across the country away from the pike. 

Bate had utterly failed to grasp the significance of 
Ruger's passage, claiming that his flank was in danger, 
and his representations to that effect were so urgent 
that Johnson's division was brought up between nine 
and ten o'clock and posted on Bate's left, Johnson's 
line and the line of Bate's refused brigade paralleling 
the pike at a distance of not more than one hundred 
fifty yards. Many contradictory statements have been 
made relative to the distance of that part of the Con- 
federate line from the pike. The owner of the land 
pointed out to me a small plantation graveyard as 
being just inside their line that night. He said that 
the position of their line was marked, after they had 
gone in the morning, by the rail barricades they had 
built, and by the remains of their bivouac fires, and he 
very positively asserted that no part of their line, fac- 



The Battle of Spring Hill 39 

ing the pike, was distant more than one hundred, fifty 
yards from the pike. All the intervening space was 
cleared land. When the divisions of Cox, Wood, and 
Kimball came up from Duck River later in the night, 
they marched along unmolested within that easy range 
of the Confederate line and could plainly see the men 
around the bivouac fires. A staff officer was stationed 
on the pike beyond Johnson's left, where the fires first 
came into view, to caution the troops as they came up 
to march by the fires as silently as possible. Captam 
Bestow, of General Wood's staff, has related that when 
the officer told Wood, riding at the head of his divi- 
sion, that the long line of fires he could see paralleling 
the pike so closely on the right was the bivouac fires 
of the enemy, the veteran Wood was so astounded that 
he exclaimed: "In God's name, no!" When they 
came abreast of the fires one of Wood's orderlies, 
believing it to be impossible they could be the enemy, 
started to ride over to one of the fires to light his pipe, 
but had gone only a short distance when he was fired 
on, and came galloping back. A colonel of Johnson's 
division has stated that he held his regiment in line, 
momentarily expecting an order to open fire, until his 
men, one after another, overcome with fatigue, had 
all dropped to the ground to go to sleep. Some of 
Johnson's men, on their own responsibility, went out 
on the pike between the passage of the different divi- 
sions, to capture stragglers for the sake of getting the 
contents of their haversacks. They were the men who 
made it unsafe, as reported by General Stanley, for a 
staff officer or an orderly to ride along the pike when 
a column of troops was not passing. 



40 John K. Shellenberger 

General Hood had gone to bed in Thompson's house 
when he was informed that troops were marching 
along the pike. Without getting out of bed he di- 
rected Colonel Mason, his chief of stafif, to send an 
order to Cheatham to advance on the pike and attack, 
but Mason admitted the next day, as stated by Gov- 
ernor Harris of Tennessee, who was serving as a vol- 
unteer aid on Hood's staff, that he never sent the 
order. This strange neglect on the part of his own 
chief of stafif affords a fitting climax to all the rest of 
the imbecility that contributed to Hood's failure after 
he had personally led the main body of his army to a 
position where by all ordinary chances success should 
have been certain. 

There is a bit of Stanley's report that gives a clear 
glimpse of the situation as Schofield and Stanley be- 
lieved it to be after they had met that night: 

General Schofield arrived from Columbia at seven o'clock 
in the evening with Ruger's division. He found the enemy 
on the pike and had quite a skirmish in driving them off. My 
pickets had reported seeing rebel columns passing, east of our 
position, as if to get possession of the hills at Thompson's 
Station, and the anxious question arose whether we could force 
our way through to Franklin. It was determined to attempt 
this, and General Schofield pushed on with Ruger's division 
to ascertain the condition of affairs. 

Another vivid glimpse is afforded in the statement 
of O. J. Hack, a conductor on the railroad, who was 
also interested in a store at Columbia. He came down 
the road that day on the last train southbound, having 
in charge some goods for the store. At the Spring 
Hill station he met the last train northbound and from 
the trainmen learned that the army was retreating. 



The Battle of Spring Hill 41 

The two trains stood at the station that afternoon. 
Some time after dark, being anxious to save his goods, 
Hack went over to Spring Hill in quest of a guard to 
run the trains back to Franklin. On inquiring for 
headquarters he was directed to a large brick house 
where he found Schofield and Stanley together. Scho- 
field, recently arrived from Duck River, had just been 
getting Stanley's account of the situation; and Hack 
said that Schofield was in a condition of great agita- 
tion, "walking the floor and wringing his hands." 
When Hack had told what he wanted, Schofield 
sharply replied that the enemy had possession of the 
road north of Spring Hill, and the trains could not 
move. The report of Stanley and the statement of 
Hack concur in showing that it was then Schofield's 
belief that Hood had possession of the Franklin Pike; 
that the army was caught in a trap ; that the only way 
out was the desperate expedient of forcing a passage 
by a night attack, and, failing in that, he must fight a 
battle next day under so many disadvantages that ruin- 
ous defeat, with the probable loss of the army, was 
staring him in the face. It would be interesting to 
know what Schofield then thought about his intimate 
knowledge of Hood's character, and his cool calcula- 
tion based thereon, for which he afterwards so un- 
blushingly claimed so much credit. 

The two trains stood at the station until daylight 
was beginning to dawn, when a detail of men came 
and began to build fires to burn the cars; but the 
detail was driven away, and the fires extinguished, 
before much damage was done, by the advance of 
the enemy. The two trains thus captured afforded 



42 John K. Shellenberger 

the transportation to which Hood alluded in a letter 
to Richmond, written when he was in front of Nash- 
ville, wherein he stated that he had captured enough 
transportation to make use of the railroad in bringing 
up supplies. Schofield ignored the loss of the two 
trains, for, in his official report, he explicitly states 
that with the exception of a few wagons and of a few 
cattle that were stampeded, he arrived at Franklin 
without any loss. 

When Schofield "pushed on with Ruger's division 
to ascertain the condition of affairs," on his arrival at 
Thompson's Station, three miles north of Spring Hill, 
he found camp fires still burning, but the brigade of 
cavalry that had been in possession there, withdrew 
without making any resistance. This very consider- 
ate action on the part of the cavalry was another of 
those lucky fatalities that so notably contributed to 
the escape of our army when such special fatalities 
were a vital necessity for its escape. After posting 
Ruger there to hold the cross roads, Schofield returned 
to Spring Hill, where he arrived about midnight at 
the same time with the advance of Cox's division com- 
ing from Duck River. With this division he then 
hurried through to Franklin, picking up Ruger as 
he passed along, and thus saddling Stanley with all 
the risk of saving the artillery and the trains. 

If they had been lost Stanley would have been the 
scapegoat but, with the same skill with which that 
afternoon he had blufifed off ten-twelfths of Hood's 
army with a single division, Stanley that night saved 
the artillery and the trains. At three o'clock in the 
morning, when only a part of the trains had pulled 



The Battle of Spring Hill 43 

out, the long column on the pike was brought to a 
standstill by an attack some place in front. The situ- 
ation was so critical that General Wood, who was then 
with Stanley, believing it would be impossible to save 
both troops and trains, advised that the trains be aban- 
doned. Stanley, however, persevered until the attack 
was beaten off and the column again in motion. The 
two trains of cars had to be abandoned because a 
bridge had been destroyed north of the station, and 
about forty wagons were lost in the attacks made by 
Forrest between Thompson's Station and Franklin. 
Everything else was saved. 

Stanley, by the way, was one of the many good sol- 
diers who were overslaughed by the big promotion 
obtained by Schofield. Stanley outranked Schofield, 
both as a captain in the regular army and as a major- 
general of volunteers. By assignment of the presi- 
dent, gained by his extraordinary ability in the arts of 
diplomacy, instead of by fighting ability displayed on 
the battle-field, Schofield was a department command- 
er while Stanley was a corps commander, and it thus 
happened that Stanley was serving under his junior 
in rank. 

Wagner's division was the last to leave Spring Hill. 
When night came Bradley's brigade began to en- 
trench the line it was on, and kept at this work until 
nearly midnight when the men were called under 
arms, and spent all the remainder of that anxious, 
weary night on their feet. While standing in column 
we could hear to our left the rumble of the wheels 
where the artillery and the wagons were pulling out, 
and much of the time could be heard the dull tread of 



44 John K. Shellenberger 

many feet and the clicking of accoutrements that told 
of the march of a column of troops along the pike; 
but there was no other sound - not even the shout of a 
teamster to his mules or the crack of a whip. All the 
surroundings were so impressive as to subdue the most 
boisterously profane men. In expressing their dis- 
satisfaction with the situation, they were always care- 
ful to mutter their curses in a tone so low as to be 
inaudible a short distance away, for, looking to our 
right, we could see the glow on the sky made by the 
bivouac fires of the enemy, and in some places could 
see the fires with a few men about them cooking some- 
thing to eat, or otherwise engaged, while most of their 
men were lying on the ground asleep. Every minute 
of those anxious hours we were looking for them to 
awake to the opportunity that was slipping through 
their fingers and grab hold of it by advancing and 
opening fire on the congested mass of troops and 
trains that choked the pike. Occasionally our col- 
umn would move on a short distance. Any orders 
that may have been given were spoken in a low tone 
at the head of the column. You would be apprised 
that the column was moving by the silent disappear- 
ance in the darkness of your file leader. You would 
hurry after him, and taking, perhaps, not more than a 
dozen steps, would be brought to a sudden halt by 
running against him, immediately followed by the 
man in your rear bumping up against yourself. Then 
would follow an indefinite wait until the column 
would again move on a short distance. The wearing 
suspense of the long waiting, while standing on our 
feet, the exasperating halts following those false starts, 



The Battle of Spring Hill 45 

when everybody was almost frantic with impatience 
to go on, the excessive physical fatigue, combined with 
the intense mental strain when already haggard from 
much loss of sleep during the three days and nights 
preceding, make that night memorable as by far the 
most trying in nearly four years of soldiering. It 
afforded unspeakable relief when, just as daylight was 
beginning to dawn, our column finally got away in 
rapid motion for Franklin, the enemy dogging our 
heels with their close pursuit. 

The location of Hood's headquarters was central as 
to the position of his troops until nightfall, and was, 
therefore, a proper one. He was, however, too far 
away to get any personal knowledge as to what was 
going on at Spring Hill, and he had to rely on the 
reports of his subordinates who were in contact with 
our troops. The character of those reports is unmis- 
takably indicated by the second move that Hood made. 
His first move, as has been shown, was based on the 
correct theory that a part of Schofield's army was at 
Spring Hill and a part at Duck River, and it contem- 
plated thrusting in Cheatham's corps between those 
two parts. His second move, made after the fighting 
was all over and he had received the reports of that 
fighting, was based on the theory that all of Schofield's 
army had reached Spring Hill, for, abandoning all 
purpose of cutting off any part south of Spring Hill, 
it contemplated seizing the pike north of Spring Hill 
and cutting off Schofield's retreat to Franklin. 

Between sunset and dark, as stated by General Stew- 
art, which would be about five o'clock at that season 
of the year, he received orders to cross Rutherford's 



46 John K. Shellenberger 

Creek with his corps, to pass to the right of Cheat- 
ham's corps, and to extend his right across the Frank- 
lin Pike. After about five hours Stewart finally went 
into bivouac with his right more than a mile away 
from the Franklin Pike. His explanations for his 
failure were the lack of a competent guide, the dark- 
ness of the night, and the fatigue of his men. To ac- 
complish Hood's orders required a march of a little 
less than four miles by Stewart's head of column - 
about three miles by a direct country road leading 
nearly to the Mount Carmel Road, and the remaining 
distance across the country lying between the Mount 
Carmel Road and the Franklin Pike. It would seem 
that a guide might have been found among the cavalry 
who had explored the country that afternoon in devel- 
oping the position of our line between the Mount Car- 
mel Road and the railway station, west of the Frank- 
lin Pike. There were also men in some of the Ten- 
nessee regiments whose homes were in that vicin- 
ity and who were thoroughly familiar with the 
ground. That no great difficulties were involved in 
the march is proved by the fact that Johnson's division 
made a similar march in about two hours, later in the 
night, to get into position on Bate's left. The night 
was as dark, the men were as tired, the distance was as 
great, and the way was as difficult for Johnson as for 
Stewart. In view of these plain facts, it is a fair in- 
ference that Stewart made a very lukewarm effort to 
accomplish Hood's orders, that it was possible for 
him, by a display of no more energy than Johnson 
displayed, to have extended his right across the Frank- 
lin Pike as early as seven o'clock, and then when Scho- 



The Battle of Spring Hill 47 

field started north with Ruger's division about nine 
o'clock, he would have found the way effectually 
barred. 

The prime cause of Hood's failure was apparently 
the lack of confidence in his generalship on the part of 
so many of his subordinates. They had been dissatis- 
fied with his appointment to the command of the army, 
and their dissatisfaction had been greatly increased 
by the failure of his attacks on Sherman's lines in 
front of Atlanta. With the poor opinion they held of 
Hood's ability, it was not possible for them to give to 
any plan of his that wholehearted unquestioning sup- 
port that gives the best guarantee of success. Simple 
as his plan was, they all failed to grasp the importance 
of getting possession of the pike and, Cleburne except- 
ed, they all acted as if they were expecting a repetition 
of the disastrous experience that had followed the 
attacks on Sherman. The promptness with which 
Cleburne turned and rolled up Bradley's brigade, 
when he was so unexpectedly assailed on his own flank, 
was the only energetic action on the part of any of 
them after they had crossed Rutherford's Creek; and, 
no doubt, if Cleburne had not been halted by Cheat- 
ham's order, he would have gone on until he had 
reaped the full measure of success made so easily pos- 
sible by the faulty situation of our army. Amid all 
the exciting occurrences of that eventful evening it is 
amazing that no inkling of that faulty situation seems 
ever to have entered the mind of any one of those vet- 
eran generals. 

Hood made a mistake, as stated by himself, in not 
taking Lee's corps on the flank march instead of Cheat- 



48 John K. Shellenberger 

ham's corps. He believed that with Lee in Cheat- 
ham's place he would have succeeded, and in view of 
the skill with which Lee executed the part assigned 
to him to hold Schofield at Duck River, it is more than 
probable he would have given at Spring Hill far 
better support than Cheatham gave. Hood led Cheat- 
ham within sight of an easy and brilliant success, and 
it was the hesitation displayed by Cheatham, Brown, 
and Bate at the critical time, that defeated Hood's 
plan and saved Schofield's army. That their hesita- 
tion was not due to any lack of courage on their part, 
or on the part of the troops they commanded, was 
abundantly proved by the unsurpassed courage with 
which they assaulted at Franklin next day when it was 
everlastingly too late. If they had fairly utilized at 
Spring Hill one-tenth part of the courage that was 
thrown away on the breastworks of Franklin, they 
would have changed the later current of the war with 
results too far reaching to be estimated. 

The prime purpose of Schofield's campaign was to 
delay Hood. How well he succeeded in that pur- 
pose can be significantly stated in a single sentence: 
the evening of November twenty-ninth he was at Duck 
River, and the morning of December first he was at 
Nashville, more than forty miles away. Then fol- 
lowed the panicky feeling displayed by the Admin- 
istration and by General Grant, because General 
Thomas was not ready to attack Hood immediately on 
his appearance in front of Nashville. If Schofield's 
orders at Duck River had been to make no effort to 
delay Hood but to get inside the fortifications of Nash- 
ville with the least possible delay, he would not have 



The Battle of Spring Hill 49 

covered the distance in so short a time without the spur 
of Hood's flank movement. The celerity with which 
he ran out of the country was due to the scare he got at 
Spring Hill. 

From Franklin next day he wired General Thomas 
at Nashville that he had come through, but that the 
least mistake on his part, or the fault of any subordin- 
ate, might have proved fatal, that he did not want to 
get into such a tight place again, that a worse position 
for an inferior force than the one at Franklin could 
hardly be found, that he had no doubt Forrest would 
be in his rear next day, or doing some worse mischief, 
and that he ought to fall back to Brentwood at once. 
In short, his Franklin dispatches, read by the light of 
Stanley's report and of Hack's statement, clearly show 
that his mind was still dominated by the fright of 
Spring Hill, and that he could feel no security short 
of Brentwood, where he would be backed up too close 
to Nashville for Hood to have room to repeat that 
terrible flank movement. Not even the wrecking of 
Hood's army on the breastworks of Franklin that even- 
ing could reassure Schofield. He insisted on retreat- 
ing to Nashville that night when thousands of the men 
were in such a condition from more than forty hours 
of incessant marching, fortifying, and fighting that 
they dozed on their feet while they were walking, and 
in spite of the manly protest of General Cox, who was 
so urgent in his efforts to persuade Schofield no more 
running was necessary, that he offered to pledge his 
head he could hold the position. 



